Global spending on 'sovereign cloud' infrastructure is projected to reach around $80 billion by 2026, while a sector survey shows that a significant majority of IT decision-makers plan to increase their reliance on local providers to mitigate geopolitical risks.

This shift is relevant because it translates the dispute over sovereignty into technical and investment decisions: who builds and maintains data centers, who controls international traffic routes, and what regulations govern access to information. The concentration of capacity in large global providers pushes states and companies to seek solutions that regain operational and legal control over critical data and services.

The dynamics have clear causes: digital infrastructure (hyperscalers, submarine cables, AI services) requires capital and scale investments that only a few players can sustain, reinforcing network effects and dependence. At the same time, recent episodes have shown operational vulnerabilities: submarine cable projects have faced delays due to security risks in maritime areas, and companies have adjusted deployment timelines in response to unstable international conditions.

In response, governments and regional consortia are promoting 'sovereign' architectures that combine local providers with contractual and technological guarantees to keep data within national jurisdictions. In Europe, the demand for localized infrastructure and the creation of clouds with specific legal and technical requirements have surged, while in Latin America, initiatives for regional connectivity are emerging that aim to reduce external dependence.

Experts warn of two simultaneous consequences: on one hand, greater technical resilience and regulatory control; on the other, the risk of fragmentation of the digital space and a diffusion of responsibilities when critical infrastructures are distributed among states, private companies, and multinational consortia. Recent research also points to accountability gaps in extrapolated models of distributed infrastructure and AI services that rely on proprietary layers.

Public policies observed in various jurisdictions include conditional public procurement, regulatory frameworks on data storage and processing, and support for local providers to reduce 'vendor lock-in'. At the same time, the financial scale of large providers and their role in critical technological value chains limit the immediate effectiveness of isolated measures without regional cooperation or sustained investments in domestic capacity.

In summary, the dispute over digital sovereignty is no longer just legal: it is a competition for cables, centers, and algorithms. The trajectory that states take will depend on decisions that balance investment, regional cooperation, and regulation to avoid both disproportionate dependence and fragmentation that could raise the cost of essential services.